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Introduction
Financialsector instabilities are believed to play a central role in either directly causing or amplifying economic crises (see Reinhart and Rogo, 2009 ). In the past, nancial and banking crises were typically thought to be triggered by loan losses and bank runs.
More recently, however, the focus has shifted toward the role of an overleveraged banking system, and adverse shocks in asset values and overall nancial stress (see Gordon 1 However, if, due to high leveraging of the banking system, large shocks to asset prices or, more generally, to nancial markets, are potentially destabilizing rather than characterized by mean reversion, the question is: To what extent do such nancial instabilities impact real economic activity? Furthermore, what are, in turn, the reverse feedback eects toward the banking sector? These questions have been debated in recent theoretical and empirical studies.
Previous theoretical work has been mostly focusing on the destabilizing eects of high leveraging of nancial intermediaries, see BS (2013), Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 1 macro feedback eects are explored in multicountry studies. The latter, hereafter MS (2013), using nonlinear, multiregime vector autoregressions and impulse response analysis, nd that the consequences of nancialsector shocks tend to be statedependent and vary disproportionally with the size and sign of a shock.
Most empirical studies, however, including MS (2013), focus on an aggregate measure of nancial stress, such as the nancial stress index (FSI) developed by the IMF, and some measure of output. The IMF's stress index is designed to capture aggregate nancial stress of numerous countries (see Cardarelli et al., 2011) . Although this aggregate measure can provide valuable insight into the interdependence of nancialsector stress and economic activity, it does, however, due to its aggregate nature, not aord a deeper analysis of the role of specic risk drivers and transmitters and, thus, specic policy recommendations.
The question of which risk factors are particularly detrimental and may serve as early warning signal for policy makers cannot be answered by an analysis based on a highly aggregate stress index.
To overcome this decit, we rst built a theoretical model of the bankingmacro linkage with leveraging and investigate the role of nancial stress on output and vice versa and indicate individual risk drivers. Then, we explore empirically the role of both the aggregate FSI and its individual components. By exploring the individual components we expect to gain a better understanding of the implications the individual risk factors have for the real economy. In our empirical analysis, we examine to what extent there are linkages between specic nancialrisk indicators and economic activity, measured in terms of industrial production. We conduct our analysis for eight economies: the U.S., Canada, Japan, the UK; and for the four largest eurozone countries, i.e., Germany, France, Italy, and Spain.
Given that standard linear, dynamic econometric models, such as vector autoregressions (VARs), cannot capture the rich dynamic behavior implied by the theoretical model outlined below, our empirical analysis follows MS (2013) and uses nonlinear, multiregime VARs (MRVARs). This model class can capture complex dynamics and allows us to assess the implications of individual risk factors and their consequences at dierent states of the economy. To estimate the interactions between nancial stress and economic output, we conduct, for each of the eight countries, bivariate analyses, pairing industrial production with the individual FSI components.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature review on modeling real and nancialsector linkages. In Section 3, building upon BS (2013), we introduce a banking sector becoming vulnerable to overleveraging and show the potential for regime shifts in the presence of bankingmacro feedback loops. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 introduces our empirical modeling strategies and presents the results from causality and MRVARbased response analyses. Section 6 discusses possible implications from theoretical and policymaking viewpoints. Section 7 concludes. The appendix 1 gives a brief description of the NMPC algorithm that is used to solve the model and provides of the MRVARresponse plots. The asset price channel as a trigger of instability has been stressed in various studies.
In Adrian and Shin (2010), a macroeconomic risk premium drives systemic risk. The approach in BS (2013) focuses more specically on the banking sector. In their view, it is a shock to asset prices that creates a vicious cycle through the balance sheets of the banks. When prices of bankheld assets fall and, therefore, their equity value and net worth falls, the margin requirements for borrowing on the money market rise, forcing nancial intermediaries to take haircuts and to further de-lever to stay liquid. This can ultimately lead to re sales, depressing asset prices further, decreasing net worth and, thus, triggering an endogenous jump in risk and, possibly, further downward spirals.
In MS (2013), the vulnerability of banks and downward instability essentially depends on improper incentives and the lack of constraints on nancial intermediaries, facilitating ex- 3 Such situations may appear as a period of tranquility, but may also come with a high degree of fragility. In this case, as Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 shows, the present value and net worth of banks will tend to become large, because there is no adequate correction through risk premia.
4 Borrowing is likely to exceed debt capacity, resulting in excess borrowing.
Stein (2012) introduces a measure of overleveraging, namely, leveraging above the optimal level. When the borrowing bubble bursts, asset price and net worth will fall, and the risk premia and credit spread suddenly rise, reducing lending, borrowing and nancial intermediation, the process reverses.
The model presented below, builds upon both BS and MS, and also refer to Stein's (2012) overleveraging and excess debt approach. We start with a stochastic version; but then, to better understand the macro feedback loops and contrasting our view with BS and Stein, we employ non-stochastic variants. We distinguish between low and highstress regimes, which are not only characterized by excess leveraging. The regimes also depend on other co-variates, such as jumps in credit spreads, rise of nancial stress and adverse feedback from real economic activity to banks' balance sheets. A regime change will be triggered, when nancial stress jumps, due to adverse feedback from real activity to banks' operating income, causing loan losses and a fall in net worth. Thus, the bankingmacro feedback loops can be characterized by a regime of low nancial stress and stable environment for expansionary periods and booms; but, in a high stress regime, destabilizing forces that trigger contractions and recessions, due to macro feedback loops, can prevail. 5 2 Note that the capital gains could be positive or negative, see Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 For several reasons, we study these problems in an intertemporal framework. First, an intertemporal model gives better insight into tracking the paths of dynamic variables over a longer horizon. This is in particular important, when studying the sustainability of debt which can only be tracked over a longer horizon. Second, leveraging and the evolution of debt need to be considered in an asset price model, where one can dene net worth (see Geanokoplos, 2011; and Stein, 2012) . Finally, it is more straightforward to conduct policy analysis in this framework.
A specication of our model is also able to account for destabilizing macro feedback loops, which are however dissipating at an innite horizon, due to model the transversality conditions imposed. Temporary macroeconomic amplication and destabilizing mechanisms are important in the shorter run. Although this has been known, they are rare in standard DSGE models, which are mostly characterized by mean reversion.
The following amplifying eects could be at work and potentially trigger nancialsector instabilities:
• On the real side, there can be regimedependent multiplier eects, acting, for example, more strongly in recessions than in expansions (cf. MS, 2012).
• Due to credit spreads, interest rates can be regimedependent (and dierent from the interest rate implied by the Taylor rule), making them, for example, counter-cyclical.
This has been extensively discussed in the literature on the nancial accelerator.
Also, in certain regimes, there can be constraints on agents' income, credit and liquidity.
• 6 Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) extensively treat the Fisher debtdeation eect, but they also stress the eects of deleveraging households on demand.
5
• The assetprice channel can be amplifying through wealth eects on aggregate demand. This can, for example, amplify an upswing with asset prices rising, but also accelerate a downswing and the severity of a recession in periods of large asset price losses.
• Credit expansions depends on net worth of households, rms, banks and sovereign states. As net worth is rising, the nancial sector is willing to expand loan supply, but reduces loans, if net worth falls. With loan losses rising and asset prices falling, banks' vulnerability increases, reducing loan supplies. 
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we are following here, but also in Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 Though BS employ a continuous time version, we formulate here the problem as discrete time variant with a discounted instantaneous payout, c t , and an optimal leveraging, x t , in (1)-(4).
10 Preferences are given by (1), the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock by (2), 11 net worth by (3), and the stochastic shock process by (4) . We model this as nite horizon decision problem, with decision horizon of N , in discrete time, as:
9 The derivation of the optimal leveraging of the Stein (2012) model can be undertaken analytically, assuming certain restrictions, for example log utility. Here we want to focus on the solution of the dynamic version, with shocks, that displays the mechanism of overleveraging. This allows to be compared with time series data on banks, see Ebisike and Semmler (2014).
10 In BS (2013) there is also an equation for the evolution of capital stock of the banks as well as for the households which actually then gives rise to two more decision variables an state variables in their context. We neglect those aspects here rst, to focus solely on the net worth dynamics. Capital stock will be used in sect. 3.2.
11
In the solution procedure here we neglect equ. (2) . It represents in BS the aggregate capital (with g the growth rate and δ the resource use for managing the assets) of nancial specialists and households.
A larger fraction of it will be held by nancial specialists, since they can borrow. Those details can be neglected here. The aggregate capital will be considered in sect. 3.2. Figure 1 : Path of optimal payout, c, red line, and optimal leveraging,
Hereby c and x are the two decision variables, with c = C/x 1 , and x = 1 + f, f = d/x 1 , with f = d/x 1 the leverage ratio, measured as liability over net worth, and d, debt, h =step size, y =capital gains, driven by a stochastic shock, ν 1 logx 2,t . Furthermore, r, is the return on capital, i, the interest rate, also driven by a stochastic shock, ν 2 lngx 2,t 12 , and aϕ(x 1,t ) is a convex adjustment cost, ρ, a persistence parameter, with ρ = 0.9, and z k is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and a variance, σ = 0.03. We solve this through a stochastic version of NMPC, see Gruene et al (2013) and appendix 1. Figure 1 presents the path of the payout, c t , red line, and leveraging x t = 1 + f t , blue line.
As can be observed the stochastic capital gains and interest rates generate a volatility of both, payout and leveraging. Note that we solve here only for optimal leveraging.
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The payouts tend to move with leveraging. Both BS as well Stein assume that in each period the debt is redeemed and, without cost, frictionless re-obtained on the market.
In gure 2 the black line is the path of net worth, upper line, and the red line is the process of stochastic shocks, with the expected value of one, lower line. One can observe in gure 2 that the volatility of net worth is considerably lower than for the stochastic 12 Stein (2012) posits that the interest rate shocks are highly negatively correlated with capital gains' shocks, we have thus a negative sign in equ (3) . We here also assume that the interest rate shocks have smaller variance than the capital gains' shocks.
13 Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 computes then also actual leveraging and can thus dene excess leveraging. We want to note that in BS there is only implicitly a macro feedback loop stylized, namely an externality, i.e. endogenous volatility, that is triggered below the steady state which makes the steady state unstable downward and not mean reverting as in Bernanke et al. (1999) . In BS the feedback loop arises from large shocks, the re sale of assets, fall of asset prices and fall in net worth, generating a downward spiral.
14 Though in the above model (1)-(4) instability is not modeled yet, the above gure 1 depicts the volatility of x t , the optimal leveraging, and the payouts, c t . 15
Through our numerical computations we can also directly observe the leveraging as dened in BS (2003: 23) as the ratio of assets to net worth: The upper graph of gure 1, the blue line, represents this ratio. As BS properly state, through leveraging, the capital share of banks in total capital the share of nancial experts in their terms is greater than the net worth of banks, due to the extensive leveraging of them, even at the stochastic steady state. This is also what creates the source for endogenous risk. What is missing in BS but also in Stein is the specication of macro feedback loops generating further amplications. Feedback loops as discussed in sect. 2 will be studied next.
Bank Leveraging with Adverse Macro Feedback Loops
To do this we will modify the model of sect. 3.1 and introduce also more explicitly the capital stock dynamics. In BS the capital stock is shared by households and banks (nancial experts), but remains relatively passive. We also introduce more specically the evolution of leveraging by dening debt now as state variables, as macro economists have proposed when studying the nancial-macro link. We also consider the eect of leveraging in the households' welfare. 16 We study two regimes a regime of low debt and low nancial stress and a regime with high leveraging and high stress.
Low Leveraging and Low Financial Stress
The low stress regime is characterized by low interest rates on borrowing, low leveraging and no credit spreads. This can be seen as equivalent to the case of the central bank pursuing a low or near zero interest rate policy which keeps the economy in a low nancial stress regime. The detailed measure of nancial stress will be discussed in sect. 4. Our model variant for the low stress regime reads as follows:
In (5) there are preferences over log utility, now penalized by some excess leveraging.
17
Hereby we have µ t = b t /k t , µ * = steady state leveraging. The decision variables in (5) are payouts (for consumption), c t and growth rate of capital stock, g. 18 Actually in the numerics we can takec = c/k, and then multiply it by k in the preferences, so that the rst two choice variables can be conned to reasonable constraints between 0 and 1.
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does not have to be very large, or go to innity.
19
As above in equ. (2) equ. (6) represents the evolution of capital stock. It increases due to investment but declines due to the resource use to manage the assets, δ. 20 Note that BS (2013) have normally distributed shocks and volatility dependent asset prices and returns.
We here present and solve a non-stochastic version, but with nonlinearities.
Equ. (7) represents the dynamics of banking leveraging. 21 with y = Af (k) the return on capital, with A > 0. 22 The interest payment on debt, rb t , increases debt but the surplus (y t − c t − i t − ϕ(g t k t )) the excess of income over spending decreases debt. Hereby we have dened i = g t k t . Note that payouts and investment are separate decision variables. Moreover, ϕ(g t k t ) is the adjustment cost for investment, which is presumed to be quadratic.
Note that the model has two decision variables and two state variables. We could have formulated the second state equation in terms of net worth and leveraging, the latter as a decision variable as in BS. We prefer leveraging here as a state variable where then debt can only sluggishly be redeemed and issued again. We can also bring in the distinction between the discount rate and interest rate, the latter impacted by leveraging. 23 One can also allow the income y to be split up into y = normal return on capital + capital gains, as in Stein (2012) . Then the excess return on capital income over the interest rate, fueled through capital gains, can be used to service the debt, see Stein (2012, chs 4-5).
We can solve our above model (5)-(7) by using again NMPC.
24 Assuming here r = 0.04, δ = 0.03 and quadratic adjustment cost of investment, we obtain the following solutions using NMPC.
For a regime of low nancial stress, in gure 3 the vertical axis shows the leveraging, the horizontal is the capital stock. The paths are shown for dierent initial conditions. Given low interest rates and low stress, all three initial conditions lead to convergence. The upper two initial conditions represent the starting point for low operating income ow, The NMPC numerics guarantees that the transversality condition holds the trajectories are not explosive but converge toward a steady state where the left hand side of equ.
(7) is zero. 25 We can have here global stability if the central bank can manage to keep the interest rate and credit spread down. In such a regime of low nancial stress debt sustainability is prevailing.
26
This may, however, generate a tranquil period where there are large capital gains, entailing an asset price boom, where risk premia are low and asset prices rise. Yet, when an overleveraging occurs and the asset price bubble bursts and capital gains become negative, then net worth may quickly deteriorate. As the debt ratio rises and the capital gains fall, and interest rates and credit spreads are likely to rise the latter being negatively correlated with the capital gains net worth of the assets can also quickly vanish.
27 This may give rise to a new regime.
High Leveraging and High Financial Stress
We next allow the nancial stress and credit spread to be endogenous. We here employ economic mechanisms that entail endogenous feedback loops of the nancial stress to macroeconomic activity, generating non-linearities, possibly giving rise to greater instability. This is likely to occur if the central bank is not attempting or not being able to pursue a monetary policy to reduce nancial market stress and to bring down credit spreads. Let our model now be dened as follows
The dierence to the model of low stress regime is here now that we assume that there is a state dependent credit spread. The built up of nancial stress is a nonlinear function of the leverage ratio. Since we want to have the function to be bounded we can dene it by a function such as given by:
This function makes the credit cost depending on a state variable, s t , a threshold variable, c * , and a slope parameter, γ. The above represents the logistic function often used in 27 For details of such a scenario and an exact measure of overleveraging, as compared to optimal leveraging, see Stein (2012).
28 Note, however, we take this to represent nancial stress. Empirically we will introduce a host of factors generating nancial stress. Note also that in the numerics we approximate the function used here by an arctan function which is numerically more convenient, which has however the same shape. For further details on the logistic function, see Schleer and Semmler (2013).
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STAR models.
29 . It is also roughly the function that has been empirically observed in De Grauwe and Ji (2012), 30 but one can also derive from Roch and Uhlig (2012). 31 In our numerical solution procedure we will approximate this function above by a closely related function.
32 . Figure 4 : Debt dynamics for nonlinear nancial stress eects; lower three trajectories for low stress case with borrowing cost below a threshold, for three initial conditions, convergence to some steady state, even in high stress regime but for low credit costs; yet triggering of unstable dynamics, upper trajectory; for initial conditions k(0) = 1, b(0) = 0.9 with high credit cost
In gure 4 we present two cases. In the rst case there is state dependent risk premia and credit spread but the leveraging (expressed by initial conditions) is low. Credit risk and nancial stress do not build up and there are no adverse macro feedback eects. The lower three trajectories represent this case, with initially low stress and with borrowing cost below some threshold. For these three initial conditions we can observe a convergence 29 For example used in the VSTAR model of Schleer and Semmler (2013) 30 Presenting there EU debt and bond yield data, see also Corsetti et al (2012) . 31 In DSGE models the rise of risk premia and its persistence on a high level is often modeled through large shocks with some strong persistent, see also Gilchrist et al (2011) . 32 Since in our numerically we cannot directly read in the nancial stress, s t , we approximate (11) by an arctan function such as r(b t /k t ) = βarctan(b t /k t ) with the state variable s = b/k. We hereby have set β = 0.1. In this function the credit cost rises in a non-linear way with leveraging, rst slowly, then more rapidly but is nally bounded. Yet, the latter function behave the same way as the above logistic function, except it is a bit atter at its upper and lower branches. Also, the arctan function is not bounded by 1 and 0 but can move in reasonable bounds as needed to approximate actual credit cost.
14 to the steady state.
In the second case the initial leveraging is higher. The function (11) , representing the steeply rising credit spread, making the credit cost rising with higher nancial stress.
Note also if in this case we were to look at the asset side of the economy, asset prices are likely to fall or do not grow any more and capital gains could become negative and the income y would need to be adjusted to a lower level 33 and surpluses would shrink, the debt service rise with higher interest rates and debt sustainability becomes threatened.
34
Next we consider a slightly modied variant of the above case. As in sect. Though optimal payouts and and investment might be targeted, actual operating income of banks, are likely to decline due to the macro feedback loops. So overall we may experience that actual gross operating income in (13) adjusts downward:
y a t = (1 − r(s t |γ, c * ))(y t ) (13) Note that in equ. (13) we have dened actual operating income to be driven by aggregate activity in the regime of nancial stress (1 − r(s t |γ, c * ))(i opt + c opt ), where actual payouts and investment, responding to nancial stress, (1 − r(s t |γ, c * )), are determining actual income. So the optimally chosen decision in each time period of the state variables are 33 Stein (2012) suggests then to make corrections by suggesting to take the trends/drifts in capital gains that would better measure some optimal debt. The borrowing exceeding that debt would amount to excess borrowing.
34 For a scenario like this see Stein (2012) where this is exemplied with macroeconomic data for Spain and Ireland. actually not realized, but the actual outcome depends on the degree of nancial stress and the macro feedbacks triggered by this.
The outcome of both the nancial stress and the macro feedbacks are captured in the upper two trajectories of gure 5. Actually what is modeled here is what has been called the feedback of nancial market stress on aggregate demand and output.
This version
of the model is also numerically solved using by NMPC. We illustrate the outcome for two versions. In both versions we are in a regime of high nancial stress. As to the upper unstable trajectories, the economic intuition is that stronger macroeconomic feedback loops 37 , with negative impact on demand, may arise due to the following:
• There is the wealth eect reducing aggregate demand when the capital appre- 38 The share of those households matter, since there is empirical evidence that the drop in demand will be larger for households with larger debt, that are forced to deleverage more, see Eggertsson and Krugman (2012).
39 See also Semmler (2012, 2013) 40 This documented by the ZEW nancial condition index as presented in Schleer and Semmler (2013 We expect thus, starting with a leverage ratio roughly above normal that the above macro feedback mechanisms lead to higher nancial market stress, higher risk premia, higher credit spreads, less credit supply and lower demand and output, leading to a contraction in the utilization of the capital stock, and falling capital stock, with increasing stress to the banking system.
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Given those above sketched adverse macro feedback loops, it can be explained why there might be a regime switch from a low to a high stress regime where the vulnerability of nancial intermediaries increase and a faster deterioration of demand and output can occur which has then again feedback eects from the real to the nancial side. This is happening the more, the more central banks fail to undertake an unconventional intervention into asset markets. Overall, in this latter case there is only a smaller stability region left. The corridor of stability has shrunk and even small shocks may matter, see BS (2013) and Dimand (2005) .
Measures of Real Activity and Financial Stress
To study the question of how nancial stress and real economic activity empirically interact, appropriate proxies for the phenomena under investigation need to be specied. As our empirical analysis is based on data sampled at a monthly frequency, the growth rate of industrial production (IP) is a reasonable measure for real activity. It should be kept in mind, however, that the relative sizes of the industrial sector dier across the countries, which could induce heterogeneity in our empirical nding.
We use the components of the advanced nancial stress index the IMF constructs on a monthly basis for advanced economies as measures of nancialsector risk. • Inverted term spread: Government short-term rate minus government long-term rate.
• Bankingsector beta: The standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM) beta, computed over a 12-month rolling window. A betavalue above one indicates that banking stocks are more volatile than the overall stock market, suggesting that the banking sector is excessively risky. To link the beta measure to bankingrelated nancial stress, the IMF lets the banking beta only enter when returns on bank stocks are lower than the overall market return.
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Securities markets:
• Corporate debt spreads: Corporate bond yield minus longterm government bond yield.
• Stock market returns: Computed as the monthtomonth change in the stock index multiplied by minus one, so that a decline in equity prices corresponds to increased securities-market-related stress.
• Stock market volatility: Measured as the 6-month (backward looking) moving average of the squared monthonmonth stockindex returns.
Foreignexchange markets:
• Foreign exchange market volatility: Measured as the 6-month (backward looking) moving average of the squared monthtomonth growth rate of the exchange rate.
All series are de-meaned and standardized, so that values around zero reect, on average, a neutral nancialmarket condition across the subindices, while positive values indicate nancial stress. A value of one indicates a one-standard deviation from average conditions.
The aggregate FSI is simply the (standardized) sum of the seven components and, hence, has the same interpretation as the individual stress indicators. Figure 6 , as an example, shows the time series of the stress indicators together with the (scaled) IP levels for the US.
46 Otherwise it is set to zero, so that the truncated paths, after de-meaning and standardization, arise. We conduct bivariate tests for Granger causality with respect to component and the aggregate FSI. We regress IP growth on a constant, lagged IP growth and lagged values of the respective stress indicators, using a common lag length of four. Table 1 reports the p-values of these tests.
Treating pvalues below 0.10 as mild and those below 0.05 as strong empirical evidence, the Grangercausality tests reveal some specic patterns. For one, stockmarket returns are a good leading indicator of economic activity. For all eight countries, the hypothesis of no Grangercausality is rejected. Overall, the rejection is rather strong: for ve of the eight countries, we have signicance at the 99%level, for two countries (France and Spain) at the 95%level, and the weakest rejection, with a pvalue of 0.074, is for the UK.
Corporate debt spreads, another securities markets indicator, signicantly Grangercause real activity, except in Japan, France and Italy. The third securitiesmarkets indicator, stockmarket volatility, plays only for the U.S. and Japan a signicant role.
Among the bankingstress drivers, beta turns out to be insignicant in all eight cases.
The TED spread and term spread are both signicant in the U.S., Canada, and Germany;
in addition, the term spreads Grangercause in the UK and in Italy. FX volatility appears to aect IP growth in Canada and Japan.
Finally, except for Spain, the aggregate FSI Grangercauses IP growth in all countries at highly signicant levels. to regressing IP growth on its own lags and lagged stressindicator values, we also include a variant of the stressindicator as regressor that assumes the value of the stress measure when it exceeds the sample median and is zero otherwise. I.e., for each country we estimate
where si t−i represents a generic stress indicator; and 1 {si t−i >si thresh } is an indicator variable that is one, if si t−i exceeds a predened threshold, and zero otherwise. We simply dene the sample median as threshold.
47 Thus, the coecient associated with regressor si t−i is γ i + δ i , if si t−i is above the threshold, and simply γ i , if it does not exceed the median. In line with the standard approach to Grangercausality, we test the joint signicance of δ i , i = 1, . . . , p.
The results, shown in Table 2 , demonstrate that already this crude check delivers an indication for the presence of nonlinear dynamics. Whereas linear tests do not nd that the banking beta causes growth, it turns out that the European economies, with the exception of Spain, are aected by large beta values. IP growth rates in Japan and the UK, which do not appear to be linearly aected by TED spreads, seem, however, to respond to high TEDspread levels. For the term spreads, the third variable in the banking group, we do not nd that large values have an impact that goes beyond that of a linear specication.
With respect to the securitiesmarkets indicator group, corporate spreads are found to also have a nonlinear impact on U.S. and UK growth. For Italy, where there is no evidence for linear causality, we strongly reject that large spreads do not Grangercause growth.
With the exception of the U.S. and Japan, we do not nd that abovemedian stock return losses have an impact on IP. Beyond linear eects, growth in Japan is also driven by abovemedian stockmarket and FX volatility.
47 The sole exception is the banking beta, which, by construction, is only recorded when bank stocks underperform the market. This eliminates more than half of the sample. We, therefore, set the threshold to 25%quantile of the remaining observations. The tests for Grangercausality reported in the previous section gives insights into the questions whether abovemedian levels of a stress indicator aect on real activities differently from belowmedian ones. They do, however, not provide information about how they aect growth. Impulseresponse functions derived from estimated linear VAR models are commonly used in linear settings. In the presence of nonlinearities, this is a valid strategy, when studying local behavior due to innitesimal disturbances. In generally, it will not provide meaningful insights into responses to large shocks, nor does it allow for statedependence or sizedependence in the response behavior. Also, as MS (2013) point out, the presence of socalled corridor stability, discussed in the earlier literature on Keynesian macro dynamics (cf. Dimand, 2005; Bruno and Dimand, 2009 ) and also referred to in the context of nancialmarket regulation (cf. Schinasi, 2005) , cannot be analyzed using conventional, linear VAR specication.
Given these decits, MS (2013) employ a more general modeling framework that can accommodate varying dynamic patterns. Specically, they use multiregime vector autoregressions (MRVAR)s in form of threshold vector autoregressions in the vein of Tong (1978 Tong ( , 1983 ) and (Tsay, 1998) , to allow for regimedependent phenomena.
48 The thresholdbased MRVAR approach is a simple and parsimonious strategy for nonparametric function es-48 For an application of the MRVAR approach to assessing the scal multiplier see Mittnik and Semmler (2012) .
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timation and for modeling multi-equilibria settings (Hansen, 2000) .
The MRVAR specication we use is given by
where r t−d , d > 0, is the value of the threshold variable observed at time t−d; and regimes are dened by the threshold levels −∞ = τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · < τ M = ∞. In the following, we restrict ourselves to tworegime VARs, with the nancialstress indicator dening the threshold variable. response can be derived analytically from the estimated VAR parameters (cf. Mittnik and Zadrozny, 1993) . For nonlinear settings, Koop et al. (1996) propose the use of simulation based generalized impulse responses (GIRs), which depend on the overall state, z t , the type of shock, v t , and the response horizon, h,
where the overall state, z t , reects the relevant information set.
For each of the risk components 50 and all eight countries, we derive generalized, cumulative responses from estimated MRVARs with regimes being dened by above and below median stress values. By choosing the median as the threshold level, we divide the samples evenly into high and lowstress phases. This diers from the regimedependent testing for Granger causality discussed in the previous section. There, the estimated MRVARs served as a descriptive tool for detecting possible nonlinearities. As a consequence, we were interested in obtaining regimes that yield the best piecewise linear t for the data and, thus, probably most distinct regimes, in order to obtain high diagnostic power.
When conducting response analysis with the application of policy intervention in mind, we 49 For details on MRVAR specication and estimation and a discussion of the advantages of specication (15) Altogether, the plots indicate substantial evidence for statedependence and signasymmetry in IP responses to nancial stress. In particular, we observe state or regime dependence of nancial stress shocks on IP for the spread variables, i.e., TED spreads, term spreads and corporate bond spreads. For TED spreads, see Figure 7 , we nd that a positive stress shock in a highstress regime has mostly a stronger impact on IP than in a lowstress regime; and a stress reduction negative shock has, as a rule, a stronger impact in high as compared to lowstress regimes. This holds especially for the U.S., Canada, Germany, and, to some extent, for Italy. For other countries, such as Japan, the UK, France, and Spain, the hypothesis holds only partially or the responses lack signicance.
Stronger results are obtained for term spreads (Figure 8 ). As banks are typically short term borrowers and longterm lenders, it comes as no surprise that the (inverted) term spread is a central variable for the stability of the banking sector. For most of the countries (except Italy) a positive stress shock in an already highstress state, arising from term structure shocks, reduce IP more than in a regime of low stress, with the reverse holding for stress reductions. Stress reduction has a greater eect in high stress regimes, except for Spain, where the results have the right sign in the low stress regime, but are not signicant.
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As to corporate bond spreads (Figure 9 ), we nd that the signs of the responses are mostly as expected and the size of the eects of shocks are dierent in highstress as compared to 25 the lowstress regime. This is not fully the case for Canada and Italy and is less veriable for Japan, Spain, and France. For the latter countries the dierence in the results might come from the fact that the nancial market is more bank-based than market-based, as Bijlsma and Zwart (2013) argue.
We obtain less strong results for the other proposed risk drivers. As to the role of (negative) stock returns as stress factors (Figure 10) , with the exception of the U.S. we see low signicance in the responses. This may come from the fact that, overall, stock returns are an overly noisy risk measure and only potent in combination with sectorspecic stress (like the real estate market, see Stein 2011), or jointly with other nancial stress variables.
Similarly, less clear results can also be seen for stockprice volatility (Figure 11 ), which has the predicted impacts only in the high and lowstress regimes in the U.S. and Japan.
More bankbased nancial systems and less deeply developed nancial markets seem to be less vulnerable to stock market volatility.
Finally, responses to shock in FX volatility (Figure 12 ) have the predicted outcome mostly for standalone countries, meaning for countries that have their own currency. The responses in countries that are members of the eurocurrency zone are mostly insignicant.
6
Implications of our Results
In our theoretical considerations in Sect. 3, we have stressed model variants that imply dierent vulnerability to nancial stress shocks. Also, the role of particular risk drivers that can induce regime changes from low to high stress regimes were discussed and that stress shocks may have less of an impact in low stress than high stress regimes.
Essential in the theory of BS (2013) are the banks' balance sheets and the endogenous generation of risk through re sales of assets and assetprice volatility as causes for nancial instability and a downward spiral. Though our empirical results are broadly in line with the BS (2013), the empirical results presented here, however, especially the response analyses, indicate that assetprice volatility itself, which plays a prominent role in the BS (2013) model, is not a strong driver of risk and regime changes.
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In Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 , it is the asset price and borrowing boomexcessive, non-optimal capital gains and overleveragingthat moves one out of a low risk into a high risk regime.
53 Though it it fair to assume that BS (2012) presumably wanted to explain more the rare and large event of the period 2007/08 with their theory rather than the eects above or belowmedian average states.
26
Excessive capital gains, and its negative correlation with interest rates, results in excessive leveraging, which are the risk drivers for the high vulnerability regime. Stein is, however, more concerned with a banking sector that is exposed to sectorspecic overleveraging (like real estate and agricultural sectors) through loan supplies. On the other hand, overleveraging (over and above the optimal level), in the banking sector is not directly measured, and it may not be a sucient indicator for vulnerability and nancial stress.
We also do not have a direct measure of overleveraging in the FSI. One might take the credit spreads, as we found relevant as risk drivers in our empirical study, representing overleveraging and nancial stress. but rather the riskpremiaaugmented credit spreads TED spreads and corporate bond spreads that are relevant for borrowing, lending and spending decisions as well as for debt sustainability as we have shown in sect. 3.2. As to the individual risk drivers, as table 2 has also shown, in EU countries the bank beta is also an important risk driver.
Stock market returns, on the other hand, seem to be a relevant risk driver only in the US and Japan, and share price volatility only in Japan.
Conclusions
Theoretically and empirically, we have investigated the potential role of overleveraging and nancial and realsector interactions in causing economic instabilities. Our theoretical model, building upon Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), Stein (2011 Stein ( , 2012 , and Mittnik and Semmler (2013), allows both overleveraging and adverse assetprice movementsand their impact on risk premia and credit spreadsto induce shifts to high or low risk regimes, nancialsector instabilities and downward spirals. Such phenomena are more prevalent as strong, adverse realsector feedback mechanisms exist. In contrast to innite horizon models, the solution method we have used, the NMPC method of Gruene et al.
(2013), allows us to allow for short and mediumterm amplifying and destabilizing forces, forces which are typically smoothed out in conventional dynamic models.
In an empirical multicountry study, we have assessed conjectures of our theoretical model by investigating how dierent types of nancialsector stress variables aect real economic activity. The stress variables used, are given by the individual components of the (countryspecic) nancial stress indices constructed by the IMF. We have employed Grangercausality tests and response analysis based on nonlinear, multiregime vector autoregressions to evaluate modelimplied conjectures about bankingmacro linkages. Our empirical results from eight economiesnamely, the U.S., Canada, Japan and the UK, and for the four largest euro zone economies, i.e., Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, suggest that nancialsector stress exerts a strong, nonlinear inuence on economic activity and that the nature of the inuence is more complex than can be typically captured by conventional linear modeling techniques. As was to be expected, with eight countries and six risk factors under investigation, the various risk drivers aect economic activity dierently across countries. However, there is strong empirical evidence that creditspread variables, such as the TED spread, corporate bond spreads and banks' beta, have a strong impact, whereas stock returns and stock market volatility seem to be less potent risk drivers. 
